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ABSTRACT
Jacques Derrida divides all texts into two categories in light of human encounters
with animals. On the one hand are texts produced by those who may have devoted
thought and attention to animals but have not imagined that animals might have a gaze of
their own directed back at humans. On the other hand are texts produced by those whose
thought and attention to animals has indeed been troubled, perplexed, and complicated by
the recognition of an animal’s reciprocal gaze. Derrida’s own text, “The Animal That
Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” in which he distinguishes between these two kinds of
texts, itself belongs to the latter category, as does J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals.
The struggle to comprehend animals apart from the use of humans as a standard
for evaluating and describing consciousness and being produces in one engaged in such a
struggle a profound disposition of uncertainty not only regarding animals but regarding
the capacity of a human self to have knowledge of a human or non-human other. Derrida
and Coetzee’s texts perform this uncertainty in both the arguments they advance and—
more importantly—in the form their arguments take.
The uncertainty they articulate and produce is a model of efficacious uncertainty,
a rhetorical disposition that is the foundation of a productive mode of thinking, one that
allows for multiplicity and resists the gestures of exclusion characterizing the various
fields of human discourse, especially as they are brought to bear on social, political, and
ethical life.
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The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the
eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”
I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and
reason.
—John Keats, letter to George and Thomas Keats

The disciplines of the humanities have counterintuitively taken an interest in
animals, a phenomenon which Harriet Ritvo refers to as the animal turn. “[D]uring the
last several decades,” she writes, “animals have emerged as a more frequent focus of
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, as quantified in published books and
articles, conference presentations, new societies and new journals.”1 The turn includes
scholarship in rhetoric, beginning with George A. Kennedy’s article “A Hoot in the Dark:
The Evolution of General Rhetoric” in 1992, and revisited in “Rhetoric among Social
Animals,” the first chapter of his Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and CrossCultural Introduction.2 According to Debra Hawhee, the initial response to Kennedy’s
work was “befuddlement,” yet while his interest in animals may have been initially
“untimely,” it came to be more “time[ly] than ever,”3 as evidenced by the forum on

1. Harriet Ritvo, “On the Animal Turn,” Daedalus 136, no. 4 (2007): 119.
2. George A. Kennedy, “A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 25, no. 1 (1992): 1-21; Kennedy, Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3. Debra Hawhee, “Toward a Bestial Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011): 81;
Ibid., 82.
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animals and rhetoric in Philosophy and Rhetoric in 2011 in which Hawee makes these
retrospective comments on Kennedy. Diane Davis, in addition to a contribution to that
same forum,4 had written about animals somewhat tangentially in her book Inessential
Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, but more recently has brought animals to
the fore of her work. In “Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living,” she
complicates philosophical assertions that the self-referential I foundational to
consciousness and language is peculiarly human by considering the work of biologists
from Carl Linnaeus down to the present decade. In the aforementioned forum in
Philosophy and Rhetoric, John Muckelbauer called for “reconceiv[ing] difference
(between and within species) as something other than a clumsy hierarchy,”5 and Davis
moves in that direction be reconfiguring the hierarchical binaries of difference
constitutive of so much of the Western tradition as a mutual relation in which the I of
consciousness and language does not exist prior to the object of thought and speech:
“[W]ithout an other, a trace of differentiation, there is no need or possibility for selfreference. The I, posing itself in its ‘living presence,’ is already an effect of what we
might call this rhetoricity of the living, a specter born each time in an underivable and
extrahuman rhetorical relation.”6

4. Diane Davis, “Creaturely Rhetorics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011): 88-94; Davis,
“P.S. on Humanism” in Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations (Pittsburgh: U of
Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 144-166.
5. John Muckelbauer, “Domesticating Animal Theory,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011):
100.
6. Diane Davis, “Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 47, no. 4 (2014): 548.
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In my own consideration of the texts below, I want to articulate how that I,
already unstable and multiple,7 might be further destabilized and troubled by encounters
with alterity—human, animal, or otherwise. I understand my own struggle to think about
these matters as ultimately being a response to another of Muckelbauer’s “paths”
articulated in the Philosophy and Rhetoric forum: “Problematizing the classical
opposition between (instinctive, animal) reaction and (thoughtful, human) response,”
which is “something different from rejecting, resolving, or even from dialoguing—each
of which might well structurally privilege the familiar human logos.”8 What I am trying
to write is an apologia for uncertainty.
J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and Jacques Derrida’s “The Animal That
Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” present encounters with animals mediated by texts.
They are texts that self-consciously confound their own mediating roles as texts. Their
representations of encounters between the human “self” and the animal “other”
emphasize not what might be knowable about either the self or the other, but instead
emphasize the difficulty of knowing either the self or the other. They cast doubt on the
immediacy of encounters between humans and animals and cast doubt on the immediacy
of encounters between humans and other humans, a problem the texts themselves
perform.
Human responses to animal encounters (in books, in the field, in laboratories, in
laps, on dinner plates) generally oscillate between two modes, but remain oriented by the

7. “Pure autoaffectation turns out to be an irreducible hetero-affection in which the ‘sameness’ has
already welcomed within itself the trace of an ‘otherness,’ and the me to which I intend(s) to point has
already made tracks.” Ibid., 540.
8. Muckelbauer, 99.
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same distinction marked by the paired words human and animal. One mode of response
is to emphasize dissimilarity between the pair, granting a soul, a mind, passions, and
language to the human while depriving the animal of the same. The other mode is to
emphasize similarity between the pair, either by attributing to the animal the same
privileged qualities the other mode reserves for the human, or by debasing (as it were) the
human to an animalistic nature. But emphasizing similarity does not collapse the
distinction between the human and animal pair and both modes of response seem to rely
equally on fanciful and whimsical assertions about the human as much as about the
animal. And neither mode exceeds its limitation as inevitably and ultimately
anthropocentric, as both modes are human responses to the human and animal encounter.
Coetzee and Derrida’s texts describe and perform both modes of response to the
human encounter with the animal, yet the effects of texts are not to correct, perfect, or
exceed either mode, nor to cut through the perplexing fold between the human and the
animal, but to fold and fold it again, to multiply its perplexity, to further confound rather
than clarify. Through the effects of their forms and formal features, the two texts gesture
vaguely toward an indeterminate thought, a conceptual negative space characterized by
uncertainty, circumspection, confusion, apophasis, failure, vacillation, ignorance—and
not just in reference to the human/animal distinction. But, I will suggest, my reading of
the two texts does not necessarily lead to a sterile nihilism, and experiences such as
uncertainty and confusion might be productive.

Novelist J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals is not a novel and not even quite
fiction. It is indeed a narrative and might pass for a novella or a long-running short story,
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but it is also the transcript of Coetzee’s participation in the 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures
on Human Values at Princeton University. In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee tells a story
about a fictional novelist, Elizabeth Costello, delivering an invited lecture at a fictional
university on the ethics of the human treatment of animals. The narrative has many
essayistic features, even when it moves beyond Costello’s initial lecture to subsequent
dialogue: characters advance genuine arguments and the topic of animal ethics is not
merely a pretense for telling a story. But neither is the story merely a pretense for
advancing an argument: the characters are fully formed and their conflicts are more than
intellectual. Together, both story and argument are preoccupied with animal ethics and a
problem fundamental to narrative, rhetoric, and ethics alike, which is the difficulty of
shared thought and experience between two beings, whether those beings are human or
animal. Coetzee’s presentation of the problem in The Lives of Animals can be parsed in
three dimensions: the narrative’s presentation as a lecture (and the lecture’s presentation
as a narrative), the philosophical exchanges within the narrative, and the narrative
episodes that frame the philosophical exchanges.
Fiction is already heavy with contradictions, ambiguities, ironies, and multiple
perspectives. Assertions about which voice in a work of fiction belongs to the author—or,
disregarding the author, which voice speaks for the text as a whole—are difficult tomake:
a work of fiction has more readings than readers. Academic texts like monographs,
journal articles, and lectures might also be said to have more readings that readers, but
such academic texts, as opposed to fiction, are more plausibly be read as avowals.
Presumably, the author of an academic text knows and accepts their own position, intends
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to convince the reader to understand and accept it, too, and so has carefully demarcated
what the author has “said” from what others have “said.”
Coetzee’s palindromic ploy of delivering a lecture that is a work of fiction about
an author giving a lecture compounds the difficulty in reading his text, whether as a
member of the lecture’s immediate audience or as a later reader of the printed narrative.
Coetzee’s words, as a lecture, presumably are intended to communicate something that
Coetzee wishes his audience to accept, but the audience is vexed at every turn by the fact
that they are not hearing a speech but listening to (or reading) a story. Coetzee’s text is
spoken but not pronounced, told though not a tale. A gap between author and text
becomes apparent, a dissociation between speaker and speech emerges. That gap or
dissociation perhaps might be found in any text (spoken or written), but the compound
lecture/narrative form of The Lives of Animals brings it to the fore as a preoccupation of
the reader (or listener), who is unable to discern whether the gap is made wider by the
compound lecture/narrative form or made narrower by it. Should the audience make a
close identification between Coetzee and his creature, Costello, taking what she says as
his words, too? Maybe the correct identification is between Coetzee and Costello’s
dissenters? Or could making such identifications be altogether mistaken and Coetzee’s
characters are strangers to him? Authorial intent aside, the rhetorical intent of the text is
confused: to which position, if any, does the text attempt to persuade the reader? A few
episodes from The Lives of Animals demonstrate the confusion brought on by the
combination of fiction and lecture.
The first and least example is a comparison of Costello with another character,
fictional professor of philosophy, O’Hearne. One moment that tempts close identification
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between Coetzee and Costello comes in Costello’s seminar discussion, which turns at one
point to a discussion of Gulliver’s Travels. Costello, an Australian, offhandedly refers to
herself as an “ex-colonial” and suggests that this influences her perspective on Gulliver’s
Travels.9 Coetzee, a South African (and later naturalized Australian), is likewise an “excolonial” whose works have been concerned with postcolonial political and social
realities. A correspondence between Coetzee and Costello seems natural here. Later in
the story, during Costello’s debate with philosophy professor O’Hearne, it is O’Hearne,
not Costello, who at first seems to speak from the “ex-colonial” perspective, arguing that
contemporary concerns over animals are a colonial symptom. He calls the “animal-rights
movement…yet another Western crusade against the practices of the rest of the world,
claiming universality for what are simply its own standards.”10 Costello’s rejoinder is that
“those who pioneered the industrialization of animal lives and the commodification of
animal flesh should be at the forefront of trying to atone for it.”11
When O’Hearne critiques the West, one might be inclined to hear Coetzee’s voice
as an “ex-colonial” speaking through him. In the first instance, in the discussion of
Gulliver’s Travels, identification of Costello as Coetzee’s mouthpiece seems reasonable.
But in the second instance, in the debate with O’Hearne, Costello’s interlocutor seems
also to correspond to Coetzee’s voice. Even so, Costello’s response to O’Hearne’s
critique of the West is itself a critique of the West and both positions seem to plausibly
belong to the “ex-colonial” Coetzee. And a suspicious reader might wonder if the racial

9. J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001), 57.
10. Ibid., 60.
11. Ibid., 61.
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identity of the author and his characters allows any of them to legitimately occupy the
position of “ex-colonial.” In any case, Coetzee’s text does not present a directly didactic
voice, a single thread of argument located in a single character.
The difficulty of recognizing an identification between Coetzee and any of the
characters or arguments in his text is better seen in a comparison of Costello with her
daughter-in-law Norma. The two are opposed on intellectual points and their familial
relationship is likewise fraught, but naming one as the protagonist and the other as the
antagonist—and thus identifying the arguments of the more sympathetic character as
those the author wishes the reader to accept—is not without problems. The topic of
vegetarianism is a point of overlap between the intellectual and personal conflicts
between Costello and Norma.
Costello presents herself, in some moments, as moderate and level-headed on the
issue of animals’ rights and her own practice of vegetarianism. At the formal dinner
following Costello’s initial lecture, the president of the college tells her, “[I] have a great
respect for [vegetarianism] . . . [a]s a way of life.” Costello points out that she is “wearing
leather shoes” and “carrying a leather purse,” and she counters: “I wouldn’t have
overmuch respect if I were you.”12 And in the debate with O’Hearne, Costello says she is
“wary of exclusionary gestures,” philosophical ones or social ones: “I know of one
prominent philosopher who states that he is simply not prepared to philosophize about
animals with people who eat meat. I am not sure I would go as far as that . . . .”13 But to
Costello’s family, including her son, but especially Norma, Costello’s practice of

12. Ibid., 43.
13. Ibid., 66.
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vegetarianism seems to indeed be about exclusion, and, in the end, about power. To her
family, Costello’s position on animals’ rights and her practice of vegetarianism have a
more pointed and shrill quality than they do in Costello’s public presentation of them.
At the beginning of the story, when Costello arrives at her son’s home, a conflict
ensues that is apparently a recurring one. The narrative, from the perspective of
Costello’s son John, reads: “The children are eating separately because Elizabeth does
not like to see meat on the table, while Norma refuses to change the children’s diet to suit
what she calls ‘your mother’s delicate sensibilities’.”14 Costello’s son John fears that her
outspoken vegetarianism will also be divisive at the formal dinner following her lecture,
in what is likewise apparently a recurring conflict, a situation in which someone asks
Costello why she is vegetarian and it falls to her son (“him and him alone”) to “repair the
damage” of her acerbic response: “You ask me why I refuse to eat flesh. I, for my part,
am astonished that you can put in your mouth the corpse of a dead animal, astonished that
you do not find it nasty to chew hacked flesh and swallow the juices of death-wounds.”15
And Norma describes her mother-in-law’s vegetarianism, in no uncertain terms, as
insincere manipulation:
“I would have more respect for her if she didn’t try to undermine me behind my
back, with her stories to the children about poor little veal calves….It’s nothing
but a power-game. Her great hero Franz Kafka played the same game with his
family. He refused to eat this, he refused to eat that, he would rather starve, he
said. Soon everyone was feeling guilty about eating in front of him, and he could
sit back feeling virtuous. It’s a sick game, and I’m not having the children play it
against me.”16

14. Ibid., 16.
15. Ibid., 38.
16. Ibid., 68.
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How Coetzee’s narrative depicts Costello and her vegetarianism is ambiguous. Is she
sincere or does she have ulterior motives, perhaps hidden even from herself? And if the
narrative is already unclear about the identification of Costello as a simple mouthpiece
for Coetzee, then it is clearly unclear about a position on vegetarianism. Is the story
Coetzee tells an argument for vegetarianism? Even to answer, “Yes…and no,” would
betray unwarranted certainty.
But the difficulty of identifying Coetzee’s rhetorical intent in any character or
argument of his lecture/narrative is best seen in the comparison of industrialized animal
farming to the Holocaust.
Announcing at the beginning of her lecture that she would be speaking “on the
subject of animals,” Costello almost immediately begins discussing the Holocaust, in
particular the Treblinka death camp. She discusses the Holocaust in general terms,
invoking the staggering death counts, and emphasizing the tacit complicity of the people
living near camps like Treblinka.17 By the time she draws a direct comparison between
the Holocaust and practices of industrialized farming, her fictional audience (and
Coetzee’s real audience), ought to have seen it coming, even if they are not fully prepared
for the force of its statement:
“Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty,
and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed
dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing
rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing
them.”18

17. Ibid., 19-21.
18. Ibid., 21.

10

Whether one sees the comparison as valid, in poor taste, or otherwise, there is
little in the narrative at this point to cue the reader that Coetzee may not be making the
comparison himself: Costello’s lecture carries on for seventeen pages with only a few
brief instances of narrative interruption, and the lecture comes immediately after only
three brief pages of an introductory frame that in many ways underscores the parallels
between Costello’s fictional lectureship and Coetzee’s actual lectureship. For a member
of Coetzee’s immediate audience, these words would possibly have sounded like
Coetzee’s own, ventriloquized through Costello: the audience would have heard these
words from Coetzee’s own mouth with little narrative interjection to remind them that at
this point Coetzee would be reading a story about a lecture, rather than simply giving a
lecture. For a reader, the text itself would create a similar effect: Costello’s lecture is
footnoted just as a transcript of an academic lecture would be. Six footnotes appear
before Costello comments that she has done due academic diligence by providing
citations in footnotes for her claims, and “in an uncharacteristic gesture, [she] raises and
brandishes the text of her lecture in the air.”19 Do the footnotes, particularly those first
six, belong to Coetzee as annotations of his story, or to Costello as annotations of the
lecture Coetzee has contrived to have her speak? Did Coetzee, at this point in his
delivery, also “raise and brandish” the pages from which he read? They are, nonetheless,
genuine citations of source material; both Coetzee and Costello have done due diligence
in the preparation of their lectures.
For one audience member in particular, Costello’s comparison of industrial
farming to Nazi atrocities is not rhetorically successful, though not without effect. The

19. Ibid., 26.
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day following her lecture, Costello receives a note from a poet who had been in her
audience. He indicts her not only of an intellectual misstep in the comparison she has
made, but of an ethical offense:
“You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison between the
murdered Jews of Europe and slaughtered cattle….You misunderstand the nature
of likenesses; I would even say you misunderstand willfully, to the point of
blasphemy…If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are
treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on
the horrors of the camps in a cheap way.”20
Coetzee’s narrative offers no indication of an authorial judgment about this character’s
argument, other than Costello’s response, which is to sigh and simply ask her son, “Who
is this man?” That is paltry evidence to conclude that Coetzee’s sympathy or rhetorical
intent lies with either of these characters. The two characters are quite similar: Stern, the
poet, writes in his note, “Forgive me if I am forthright. You said you were old enough not
to have time to waste on niceties, and I am an old man too.”21 And in her debate with
O’Hearne, Costello refers to a philosopher whose ideas offend her and she comments that
she would be reluctant to share a meal with someone who espoused such ideas.22 Stern,
for his part, refuses to share a meal with Costello, and is absent from the formal dinner
following her lecture.
The episode between Costello and Stern is an example of the confusion and
uncertainty that the text’s lecture/narrative form can provoke in the reader. And more
than that, the comparison of industrial farming to genocide is an example marking a limit
across which two parties cannot communicate. The comparison is a rhetorical choice

20. Ibid., 49-50.
21. Ibid., 50.
22. Ibid., 66.
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unlikely to succeed. Its effect is to affirm in their agreement those who already agree with
the position of the person employing the comparison, while only further alienating those
who do not already agree. The comparison throws into relief two opposing parties whose
prior dispositions toward the topic are already mutually unintelligible. To one, it is selfevident and powerfully convicting. To the other, it is absurd and repugnant.
The 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures at Princeton included responses to Coetzee’s
“lectures” from prominent scholars from a variety of disciplines relevant to Coetzee’s
topic. Peter Singer responds to Coetzee by casting his own arguments in a short narrative.
It depicts a dialog between Singer and his daughter about Singer’s difficulty in knowing
how to respond to Coetzee’s lecture/narrative. Singer notices the same difficulty in
reading The Lives of Animals in order to discover any authorial or rhetorical intent that I
have been trying to parse. Singer’s persona complains:
“But are they Coetzee’s arguments? . . . . They are Costello’s arguments.
Coetzee’s fictional device enables him to distance himself from them . . . .
Costello can blithely criticize the use of reason, or the need to have any clear
principles or proscriptions, without Coetzee really committing himself to these
claims. Maybe he really shares Norma’s very proper doubts about them.”23
But the effect of distancing author from text and speaker from argument is, whether
Coetzee intended it to be or not, more than simply clever. I hold the lack of commitment
to a definite position or argument to be the very claim the text (if not the author) makes.
Costello articulates the uncertain foundation of Coetzee’s text when she says, “I was
hoping not to have to enunciate principles . . . ,” and “I have never been much interested
in proscriptions, dietary or otherwise.”24

23. Peter Singer, reflection on The Lives of Animals by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 91.
24. Coetzee, 37.
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Marjorie Garber, in her response to Coetzee’s “lectures,” asks what she calls the
“central question for all literary critics”: “What does the form have to do with the
content?”25 She describes The Lives of Animals as metafiction, places it in the genre of
the academic novel,26 and notes the difficulty of taking any character to be Coetzee’s
mouthpiece, writing, “We don’t know whose voice to believe.”27 Her ultimate response
to her initial question about form and content is to conclude, “In these two elegant
lectures we thought John Coetzee was talking about animals. Could it be, however, that
all along he was really asking, ‘What is the value of literature?’”28
I agree that The Lives of Animals cannot be reduced to being about animals, but to
conclude that the something more that it is about might be the “value of literature” seems
also to be reductive. The reluctance to “enunciate principles” and pronounce
“proscriptions” evident in The Lives of Animals, together with the effect of uncertainty it
produces in its audience, amount to a claim about knowledge and the ability to speak (or
write) that are enmeshed in any discussion of animals, in any reflection on the encounter
with alterity that is the human/animal relationship.
Garber makes a passing comparison between The Lives of Animals and Plato’s
dialogues.29 The comparison is apt. The metafictional puzzle that is the form of The Lives
of Animals, functioning to confuse and defer meaning and to inhibit the communication

25. Marjorie Garber, reflection on The Lives of Animals by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 75.
26. Ibid., 76.
27. Ibid., 79.
28. Ibid., 84.
29. Ibid., 79.
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of an intended idea from the mind of the author to the mind of the listener or reader, is
not a peculiarly postmodern form. It bears a strong resemblance to Plato’s dialogs and
functions in many of the same ways. Coetzee works through philosophical problems by
having characters discuss them in scenarios like those in which Plato’s characters work
through philosophical ideas: quotidian encounters, debates private and public, formal
dinners, and the occasion of prestigious out-of-town guests. Plato’s dialogs can be dialogs
within dialogs (like Coetzee’s lecture within a lecture) and can have fairly elaborate and
seemingly incidental narrative frames. Characters are developed as personalities and not
simple personifications of philosophical positions, and identification of the author, Plato,
with the dominant speaker, Socrates, may at times seem natural, but at others dubious.
And as with Plato’s dialogs, so with Coetzee’s lecture/narrative: the stakes of the
argument are to be found in the manner in which the argument is made as much as it is in
any argumentative thread presented. Something is at stake within the text—between the
interlocutors in the dialog—but something is at stake, too, between the author and the
reader, in the reader’s textually mediated dialog with the author.
In the Sophist, the Stranger claims that the form of the dialog, a conversation
among a small group of men, is more edifying than is speech-making. Through dialog, an
interlocutor’s errors and contradictions can be exposed and thus purged from the soul,
whereas long speeches disguise error and contradictions, inducing listeners to overlook
and accept the speaker’s mistakes. Dialog (“method of questions,” “method of
dialogue,”30 “cross-questioning”31) brings an interlocutor to a state of knowledgeable

30. Plato Sophist 217.c
31. Ibid. 230.d
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ignorance; it “purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and
no more”.32
The form of the dialog, while demonstrating the “method of questions,” puts the
reader in a dialogic relationship with the text, which would itself otherwise be only the
written analogue of a long-winded speech. So, too, with Coetzee’s lecture/story. Rather
than explicate a position on a topic, Coetzee draws the listener/reader into a state of
questioning regarding his chosen topic, as well as a state of uncertainty regarding its
presentation. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals is like one of Plato’s dialogs in the use of
characters, interpersonal conflicts, extra-philosophical motivations and conflicts to
interpellate an active audience. More importantly, the dialogs are shot through with irony,
in much the same way as Coetzee’s story (which voice to trust? who, if anyone,
represents the author’s rhetorical intent?) and is at least as concerned, if not more, with
exposing contradictions and error rather than resolving them. What matters is the
performance of a method that resists and undermines the certitude and comfort of
knowledge, leaving the reader bewildered in the face of a host of others: textual, human,
and animal others.
But Garber’s question remains: “What does the form have to do with the
content?” The topic of animals is not merely a pretense for Coetzee’s exercise in form.
The lecture/narrative form serves to confound the audience’s immediate understanding,
provoking uncertainty and hesitation in the audience regarding their knowledge of the
author as other. The topic of human/animal difference, which human language is
inadequate to bridge, is actually quite a fitting topic. The keystone holding form and

32. Ibid.
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content together, when read against the arguments Costello has been making throughout
the text, is the final vignette between Costello and her son.
Elizabeth Costello rejects Western philosophy’s rationalist and humanist assertion
that humans, possessing reason, have some privileged access to knowledge of the world
as it really is, knowledge of which animals are deprived. She rejects the assertion that
reason and the universe are “of the same being” and she rejects that reason constitutes
human being, instead asserting that reason is only “a certain spectrum of human
thinking,” only “one tendency in human thought”33, and perhaps no more than the
preferred mode of thinking of a small group of humans:
“Might it not be that the phenomenon we are examining here is, rather than the
flowering of a faculty that allows access to the secrets of the universe, the
specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition whose forte is
reasoning…which for its own motives it tries to install at the center of the
universe?”34
Humanistic rationalism, as Costello describes it, is a closed system and “a vast
tautology.”35 Norma’s objection that “[t]here is no position outside of reason where you
can stand and lecture about reason and pass judgement on reason,”36 is, from Costello’s
perspective, a validation of her argument rather than a critique of it. A system that
excludes so much in order to privilege its own construction of reality is impoverished in
its totality.
Rejecting reason means that in order to level the difference between human and
animal Costello does not need to grant humanlike reasoning to animals. Instead she

33. Coetzee, 23
34. Ibid., 25
35. Ibid., 25
36. Ibid., 48

17

argues that animal thought is neither less than nor more than nor even equal to human
reason but merely different, and that human reason, regarding the animal other at least, is
debased. She demonstrates her argument through a reading of The Mentality of Apes
(1917), in which Wolfgang Köhler describes his ethological experiments on an ape called
Sultan. The ape must solve various problems in order to acquire bananas. Such
experiments of the same ilk are part of the lore of animal behavior and cognition. And
while they are anecdotally offered as proof that certain animal species or certain animal
individuals might display human-like reasoning abilities, the experiments are
simultaneously taken as evidence of animal inferiority. Köhler’s conclusions follow the
same pattern. But Costello argues that Köhler’s experiments on Sultan merely
demonstrate the animal’s conformity to an absurdly conceived scenario premised on a
simplistic version of human reasoning:
“At every turn Sultan is driven to think the less interesting thought. From the
purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is relentlessly propelled
toward lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use this to get that?)
and thus toward acceptance of himself as primarily an organism with an appetite
that needs to be satisfied.”37
Such experiments, to Costello, do nothing more than demonstrate the limitation of
humanistic rationalism. As she says to O’Hearne:
“[T]he program of scientific experimentation that leads you to conclude that
animals are imbeciles is profoundly anthropocentric. It values being able to find
your way out of a sterile maze, ignoring the fact that if the researcher who
designed the maze were to be parachuted into the jungles of Borneo, he or she
would be dead of starvation in a week….It is the experiments themselves that are
imbecile.”38

37. Ibid., 29.
38. Ibid., 62.
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Over against reason, Costello promulgates a doctrine of sympathetic imagination,
which she develops through her critique of Thomas Nagel’s essay, “What Is It Like to Be
a Bat?” Whereas the kind of thinking typified by Köhler conceives of the animal mind
not so much as different from the human mind as it is lesser, Nagel emphasizes the
otherness of the animal mind as being a way of thinking, perceiving, and experiencing the
world to which the human mind can have no access. Costello quotes Nagel: “I want to
know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this I am restricted by the
sources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task”. 39 In other
words, the difference between a bat and a human is insurmountable; the human mind and
its capacity to reason cannot have access to all ways of knowing, thinking, being.
But Costello is dissatisfied with Nagel, too. She maintains that it is possible for
human thought to surmount difference, even the last limit of otherness: death. Humans
are capable, she maintains, of “thinking our way into”40 a nonhuman state. Refusing
scientific reason and denying the strict bounds placed on empathy by Nagel, Costello
offers “sympathetic imagination,” as a way of thinking that has “no bounds”: “If I can
think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed [i.e. a fictional
character], then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an
oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life.”41
Sympathetic imagination is an appealing idea. And even though Costello’s
interlocutors are skeptical, if not incredulous, it is not a purely fanciful idea. For example,
39. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974):
439, quoted in Coetzee, 31.
40. Coetzee, 33.
41. Ibid., 35.
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the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, produced at the Francis Crick Memorial
Conference on Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals at Cambridge
University in 2012 surveys the cumulative work of several related neurological fields
comparing human and animal brain structures, and then asserts that humans and animals
have more in common than humanistic rationalists have generally been willing to
concede: “[T]he weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing
the neurological substrates that generate consciousness.”42 If humans and many animals
share similar neurological structures then perhaps it is only a small step to imagine that
they share similar experiences of being. Additionally, ethologists Alexandra C. Horowitz
and Marc Bekoff argue in defense of a cautious, meticulous anthropomorphism in the
scientific study of animal behavior; they call anthropomorphism “the explanatory
lubrication . . . between visible behaviors and the seemingly inaccessible internal states of
the animal.”43 Costello’s own readings of several poems (Rilke’s “The Panther,” and
Hughes’ “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at the Jaguar”) by Ted Hughes and Rilke
demonstrate that a poetics of sympathetic imagination is more than simple, sentimental
conjecture about animals. However plausible sympathetic imagination might be, or
however benevolent seeming it is, sympathetic imagination looks a lot like the reason
Costello rejects in so far as both are capacities for special knowledge of the animal other
that humans unilaterally grant to themselves.

42. Philip Low, “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness,” ed. Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss,
David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Philip Low and Christof Koch (Francis Crick Memorial
Conference on Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals, Cambridge, UK., July 7, 2012),
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf (accessed December 28, 2013).
A note to the document says that it was signed by the conference participants “in the presence of Stephen
Hawking.”
43. Alexandra C. Horowitz and Marc Bekoff, “Naturalizing Anthropomorphism: Behavioral
Prompts to Our Humanizing of Animals,” Anthrozoös 20, no. 1 (2007): 32.
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But plausibility aside, the idea of sympathetic imagination becomes especially
salient when it is considered in light of the final vignette with which Coetzee closes his
lecture/narrative.
Even though she has been arguing that sympathetic imagination is a capacity with
“no bounds” through which one can understand the experience of another being, Costello
herself encounters a limit to her capacity to understand the experience of other humans.
Those beings that should be to her the most familiar and accessible become frighteningly
alien. In answering her son’s question as to why she has become “so intense about the
animal business,”44 Costello reveals a profound crisis in her psyche—a crisis of
conscience and a crisis of consciousness.
She cannot reconcile the apparent goodness of the people around her with their
complicity in practices she finds horrifying and deems to be evil. She cannot fathom how
the people around her reconcile for themselves their benevolent actions in one sphere of
life and their deplorable actions in another. The experience of being a meat-eating human
is beyond the reach of her sympathetic imagination. But her struggle to understand those
non-vegetarian, tallow-soap using human others deepens when her consternation
becomes unsettling to her perception of the reality around her and her own experience of
being herself. “It’s that I no longer know where I am….Am I dreaming, I say to myself?
Yet I’m not dreaming….This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t
you?”45

44. Coetzee, 69.
45. Ibid.
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She repeats, emphatically, “Why can’t you?” and that question represents a
fundamental shift in consciousness from both the rationalistic humanism she rejects and
the principle of sympathetic imagination she espouses. Those two ways of thinking are
oriented outward from the self and satisfy themselves by asserting knowledge of/over the
other. But the question “Why can’t you?” is asked by a self whose gaze has been turned
back and encounters the self as alien, as other. I regards itself as you. And the question,
demanded of the self by the self, remains unanswered. The question yields no knowledge.
The question, “Why can’t you?” reflects the structure of a peculiar response to
alterity, whether that other is human, animal, or otherwise. Thinking about the other
often runs first in a single direction, outward from me to you (or it), and often does little
more than trace that path between the self and the object of its gaze. This is the kind of
thinking that characterizes the structure of the many –isms: racism, sexism, ableism,
speciesism, etc., in which the other is not recognized as something more than object
perhaps in possession of a being and a gaze of its own. Difference in this scheme
(however malevolent, benevolent, or innocuous) is understood as simply “different from
me.” But in the structure represented by Costello’s “Why can’t you?”, thinking about
others becomes reflexive and some crisis drives back the self’s outward gaze to encounter
the self as other. For Costello, the struggle to surmount the difference that occludes her
understanding of the people around her becomes a struggle to understand herself.
Postulating that the people (and animals) upon which her gaze falls themselves have a
being and outward gaze like her own, she strives to understand that being and experience
that outward gaze as if it were her own. She fails, with the result of estrangement from
herself, finding herself in a disoriented state of uncertainty.
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That state of uncertainty is not the result of an apotheosis. It is not a transcendent
state. The mode of being and experience represented by Costello’s “Why can’t you?” is
not a post-human mode in which the human self has attained to something more or other
than itself. This uncertain self has not colonized and acquired for itself some foreign
mode of being and experiencing. The end result of Costello’s sympathetic imagination is
not a successful crossing of the abyss of alterity between self and other. Instead,
Costello’s sympathetic imagination probes the limit of the self, encounters the abyss of
alterity, fails to overcome it, and shrinks back within human bounds chastised and more
cautious.

The trope of a limit and an abyss between the self and other, specifically between
human and animal, brings me to Derrida’s “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to
Follow). In 2002, Critical Inquiry published as “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More
to Follow)” the first portion of an extended address Jacques Derrida gave at a 1997
conference. The entire address was published in 2008 as The Animal That Therefore I Am
and included Derrida’s treatment of the modern philosophical tradition as it regards the
topic of animals. He devotes a great deal of attention to Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, and
Lacan. But the first portion is especially interesting because it introduces his themes
clustered around readings of narratives: Lewis Caroll’s Through the Lookingglass, the
second account of creation in Genesis, and a personal anecdote about being seen naked
by his cat. And just as with Coetzee’s narrative/lecture, its manifold texture is as
important as—and bound up with—its arguments.
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In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee speaks not in the first-person nor in the
academic third-person, but from behind the veil of a narratival third-person through
which an argument must be inferred by the audience from a series fictional events and a
cast of invented characters. Like Coetzee, Derrida does not speak in the conventional
academic third-person (the disembodied, timeless, and placeless voice scholars tend to
employ when pronouncing upon texts and truths). Unlike Coetzee, Derrida does not
structure his address with the scaffolding of an elaborate pretense. But even so, as he
shifts continually between the first and third persons, he does not settle into an
unselfconscious mode that purports to be a direct unmediated representation of his mind
to the minds of his audience. The digressive structure of his sentences and the baroque,
recursive ordering of his arguments prevent his audience from forgetting the mediation of
the text. Derrida reminds his audience repeatedly that the conference at which he is
speaking is entitled “The Autobiographical Animal” and he self-consciously struggles to
present himself before his audience as exposed in his entanglement with words. His very
first sentence: "To begin with, I would like to entrust myself to words that, were it
possible, would be naked.”46 His thought cannot be naked, nor can his words be naked,
try as he might to expose both. Instead, the attempt to reveal obscures as much as it
exposes, and to Derrida as an elusive an animal in his own text as Coetzee is in his.
“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” might be thought of as a
narrative in which other narratives are embedded. The outermost narrative sphere is the
one created by the publication of Derrida's transcript in Critical Inquiry; the audience is
no longer an audience of listeners present with the speaker, but an audience of readers,

46. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills,
Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 369.
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reconstructing from printed word a historical event, a thing that happened, i.e. Derrida
speaking those printed words (in French and not English) to a group of people at Cerisyla-Salle, France, in the summer of 1997. In the next narrative sphere, Derrida is reading
those same words (which later translated and publish in Critical Inquiry) to a living
audience from a manuscript. That manuscript is in turn a record (and its reading is a
reconstruction) of a prior event: Derrida, alone, composing his address, which itself could
not have been a singular, discrete, moment, in which the text appeared ex nihilo. In the
innermost narrative sphere is Carroll’s story about Alice, the Yahwist’s story about the
naming of the animals, and Derrida in his bathroom naked before his cat—each of which
is taken up again in each succeeding sphere of narrative. Derrida is to Derrida as Coetzee
is to Costello. Through the publication of Derrida’s words after the fact of their having
been spoken—making them a kind of fiction—Derrida becomes a fictional character of
his own invention set forth in print for absent readers to later reconstruct (or deconstruct,
as it were), and interpret, inventing Derrida anew for themselves.
My description of “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” as
spheres within spheres might suggest, on the one hand, that there is a center—a point of
origin, an essential core—from which the text emanates. To read Derrida that way would
be un-Derridean. On the other hand, it might suggest a continually deferred center, an
infinitesimal point of origin that might never be located. Perhaps a better model than an
onion-like figure would be the interfoliated assemblage that is a printed text: dissociated,
disordered fragments on a flat field, folded and folded again until they resemble a unified
whole, an illusion of natural and necessary linear sequence masking the breaks, edges,
and continual disjunctures of which it is composed.
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Either way, metaphors will break down and fail to fully serve the purpose of
making my assertion seem inevitable, that is, the assertion that there is a correspondence
between the form and character of Derrida’s writing and the argument he makes. Derrida
writes about time and history as non-linear, and he writes about them in a non-linear
fashion. His text is digressive and recursive, and rather than progressing through
arguments, it accumulates them until an entangled mass is produced.
For example, with the opening remarks, Derrida places himself, his text, and his
audience within a longer narrative. Many conference talks begin with remarks of
professed thanks (perfunctory or self-deprecating or flattering or even sincere) to
conference organizers and other pertinent parties, but Derrida carries on at length with
general and specific expressions of gratitude and explanations of how the present
conference came to be, how its topic fits in a larger trajectory of conferences at Cerisy
and how his own address fits within that trajectory and within the trajectory of his own
work. As a preamble, the first three-plus pages of "The Animal That Therefore I Am
(More to Follow)" seems perhaps excessive, especially to a reader who is not part of the
in-crowd of Cerisy conference-goers (or the in-crowd of Derrida readers), but it does in
fact work to frame the opening moment of Derrida's address within a view of history that
Derrida's later discussion develops, that structures the whole of the text, that echoes
Derrida's personal encounter with the gaze of an animal: a history with continuity and
difference but without origin or telos, a history that progresses recursively, neither
circular nor linear (or perhaps both) with the present moment figured as the point of
contact between a rolling wheel and the roadway it rolls upon; a history in which an event
can be a functional origin in relation to the present, while yet perhaps never having
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occurred at a specific time in the past even as it is perpetually recurring; a history in
which mythical time and clock time, individual memory and cultural memory, are
enmeshed. Derrida's text itself performs recursivity in its own recursive and digressive
style, evident in this one of many similar moments in the preamble alone: "Some of you
here, Maurice de Gandillac first of all, whom I wish to greet and thank in pride of place,
know that about forty years ago, in 1959, our wonderful hosts here at Cerisy were already
offering me their hospitality—and it was the moment of my very first lecture, in fact the
first time I spoke in public."47 In these polite remarks, Derrida brings his present moment
into contact with an original event ("my very first lecture"), that occurred at a more-orless definite time ("about forty years ago, in 1959"), that was also progressive and
recurring, individual and communal.
As an example relying on more than a few phrases, Derrida’s treatment of his
anecdote about being seen naked by his cat might better demonstrate a correspondence
between Derrida’s idea of history and his manner of structure his text, with the additional
advantage of being a key element in Derrida’s discussion of human/animal difference.
At the center of "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)" is an
anecdote Derrida tells about being seen naked by his cat and the crisis of selfconsciousness that it precipitates. To say the anecdote is at the center of the text is
inaccurate: more accurate would be to say that it is integral to the text. Derrida's telling of
the anecdote is consistent with the rest of his text in that the anecdote tells not of a
singular past event but an event that, while having happened at some point for a "first

47. Ibid., 370.
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time," is recurring and progressive to the same extent that it was originary, marking off a
before and after.
He doesn't tell the story all at once. First, it is offered abstractly and generically,
by way of example—as a hypothetical, almost. Then it is articulated as a specific moment
in time, a disruptive and singular event. Later, it is a mundane recurrence. In its most
concrete iteration, the incident is one anyone with a cat would recognize, or, for that
matter, anyone with dog or any other domestic animal free to roam the house: the animal
sees you with your clothes off, you see that it sees you, perhaps it even sees you seeing it
seeing you with your clothes off, and you wonder, what does the animal think of all this?
The resulting perplexity, for Derrida and for many who have been in the same
situation, is like trying to reason through the question about the fallen tree in the forest: If
an animal sees you with your clothes off, has it seen you naked? Derrida's answer, as
expected, resolves none of the perplexity: "The animal would be in nonnudity because it
is nude, and man in nudity to the extent that he is no longer nude."48 But the answer is
less important than the perplexity itself, produced when confronted by the other and
noticing being noticed with no recourse to know what the noticing means to the other,
"seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze that is vacant to the extent of being bottomless,
at the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive and impassive, good and
bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and secret."49 The gaze of the
animal other displaces one's human self: "[I] no longer know who I am (following) or
who it is I am chasing, who is following me or hunting me. Who comes before and who

48. Ibid., 374.
49. Ibid., 381.
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is after whom? I know longer know where my head is. . . . I no longer know how to
respond . . . ."50
The human and the animal are two aspects of the same thought in the Western
cultural and philosophical tradition. The idea of the human is not imagined without the
idea of the animal, and so encounters with animals are formative in the history of human
self-consciousness. At some definite point in time or during some progressive phase
("since time, since so long ago" is Derrida's refrain) an "abyssal limit," "a limit that grows
and multiplies by feeding on an abyss,"51 opened between human and animal. Derrida
reads the biblical story of the naming of the animals in Genesis (part of the second
creation story told in Genesis) as typifying the recurring, originary event by which the
"abyssal limit" between human and animal is discursively defined. The story is
symptomatic of a structure underlying human consciousness (in the Western account at
least) and the human relationship to the animal, a chain of gazes imagined to move in
only one direction, from God to man to animal: "He lets Adam, he lets man, man alone,
Ish without Ishah, the woman, freely call out names. He lets him go about naming alone.
But he is waiting in the wings, watching over this man alone with a mixture of curiosity
and authority."52 God sees man, but is not seen, and man "under surveillance, under the
gaze of Jehovah"53 sees the animal "without allowing himself to be seen or named" by the

50. Ibid., 379.
51. Ibid., 399.
52. Ibid., 385.
53. Ibid.
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animal.54 The animal is not a participant in the event, only an object of knowledge; the
animal has no gaze or knowledge of its own.
For Derrida there are "at bottom, two types of discourse, two positions of
knowledge":
In the first place there are those texts signed by people who have no doubt seen,
observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but who have never been seen seen
by the animal. Their gaze has never intersected with that of an animal directed at
them (forget about their being naked). If, indeed, they did happen to be seen seen
furtively by the animal one day, they took no (thematic, theoretical, or
philosophical) account of it.55
On the other hand, are texts "whose signatories are first and foremost poets or prophets,"
those who have seen themselves seen by the animal they have seen and have endeavored
to speak from that decentered subject position, to "[take] upon themselves the address of
an animal that addresses them, before even having the time or the power to take
themselves off, to take themselves off with clothes off or in a bathrobe."56 The decentered
subject position of the seen seen poet (and here Costello would agree emphatically) is,
according to Derrida, not heretofore attested in any philosophical, theoretical, political, or
legal discourse. Instead these discourses largely reflect the subject position of Descartes'
cogito ergo sum, followed (I would observe) by a tacit and implicit et omnia sum: "I
think therefore I am . . . everything: what I cannot think has no being.”
For the first discursive camp, nothing is outside human knowledge or outside the
possibility of assimilation into human knowledge. (Though Costello would see herself as
opposed to this camp of rationalists, I see her notion of "sympathetic imagination" as

54. Ibid., 386.
55. Ibid., 382.
56. Ibid., 383.
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squarely within it.) On the other hand are poets and prophets, whose subjectivity has been
disturbed by the experience of crossing gazes with the animal. The knowledge gained
from seeing themselves being seen is not knowledge of the animal other's occluded self
(nor knowledge of the world or oneself as the animal sees it) but instead a self-conscious
knowledge, a removal of oneself from the center of being and knowledge, allowing for
the possibility that one's knowledge is inevitably limited and predetermined by one's
position and capacities, and allowing for the possibility that beyond one's knowledge are
ways of knowing and being that one can never access or assimilate.
For Derrida, the animal and the human are discursively bound, and that discourse
is bound up in narrative and history as much as it is in syllogism and philosophy. These
entanglements are evident in the form and style of his essay, exhibiting the same qualities
of recursive progressivity, interrupted by constant digression and deferrals, and
disorientation and uncertainty. In addition to what I have already noted regarding
Derrida's opening comments, his anecdote about his cat and his reading of Genesis, a
rhetorical posture of uncertainty is evident in his style, in his manner of expressing his
thoughts in a manner that resists the notion of writing as an expression of thought, that
resists making the text a simple threshold across which the writer ushers the reader into a
realm of knowledge. Digressions, tortured phrases ("It follows, itself; it follows itself. It
could say 'I am,' 'I follow,' 'I follow myself,' 'I am (in following) myself.'"57), and
sentences manifoldly compounded might seem to be evidence of clouded thoughts
merely expressed in murky writing or, perhaps, to be a deliberate and obtuse occlusion of

57. Ibid., 371.
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Derrida's mind from the audience. 58 Maybe such is indeed the case; his writing
unquestionably makes for difficult reading. But maybe his writing is a performance of a
rhetorical posture of uncertainty toward his subject matter, and so only reluctantly asserts
knowledge, whether of the self or the other, and is reluctant to ever assert only one
possibility. Derrida’s writing is also a performance of a rhetorical posture of uncertainty
toward the audience. It evinces an acute consciousness of the abyss between self and
other created by language even as language attempts to cross it.
Consider Derrida's thoughts on autobiography. The title of the conference at
Cerisy is "The Autobiographical Animal," but autobiography in Derrida’s treatment is
not the label of a genre of narrative writing. Instead, Derrida construes the word as
something more like the writing of the living self, or the discourse that creates the self. A
sense of confession lurks in the sense of autobiography that calls to mind the literary
genre, a "discourse on the self" that presumes, because of "a fault, an evil, an ill," an
obligation, for the sake of "truth," to divulge oneself, expose oneself.59 Derrida asks if
autobiography is possible without this "logic of debt and owing": "Has there been, since
so long ago, a place and a meaning for autobiography before original sin and before the
religions of the book?"60 "I am trying to speak to you," he says, from that time "since so
long ago," a conceptual reality that, in the scheme of his reading of Genesis, would be
before man had founded the abyss between human and animal by his naming of the

58. Derrida writes, "Although time prevents it, I would of course have liked to inscribe my whole
talk within a reading of Lewis Carroll. In fact you can't be certain that I am not doing that, for better or for
worse, silently, unconsciously, or without your knowing." 376.
59. Ibid., 390.
60. Ibid.
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animals, a human being before shame. Derrida's writing is autobiographical, not in the
sense that he is telling us the story of his life, but in the sense that he is struggling to
present himself as a living being through language, against an ancient discourse that
seems to have predetermined his writing of himself and the other to whom he addresses
himself.
His writing is an uphill battle and it engages the audience in that battle. Derrida’s
comment on passage he quotes from Heidegger is: "I think I understand what that means
. . . ; I can understand it on the surface, in terms of what it means, but at the same time I
understand nothing."61 For me to comment the same in response to Derrida is not because
of a failure of Derrida's writing, and not (entirely) a failure of me as a reader, but a
necessary intermediary position in the encounter between self and other, between writer
and reader—a position fraught with uncertainty.62
Another example might be Derrida's neologism, l'animot. As with the anecdote
about his cat, Derrida does not introduce this element of his text all at once. He sneaks it
in, hinting at it before calling attention to it. First, animot and animots appear without
comment,63 and would not have been as noticeable to the ears of Derrida’s initial
conference audience as they are to the eye of reader encountering Derrida’s text in
translation. Then, he explicitly introduces l’animot, "a chimerical word that sound[s] as

61. Ibid., 391.
62. If a text is clear to a reader, then quite possibly the reader is doing nothing more than writing
their own self upon the text through their reading of it. A reader’s perception that a text is clear might
indicate a failure on the part of either (or both) the writer and reader. Perhaps clarity is not a hallmark of
good writing.
63. Ibid., 405, 407.
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though it contravened the laws of the French language” and exclaims "Ecce animot."64
The term, with its singular article (l') and plural sounding form (-mot would be heard as –
maux, the plural ending of animal in French), juxtaposes the animal as "a single and
fundamentally homogeneous set”65 with the heterogeneity of animals as "an irreducible
living multiplicity of mortals."66 And substituting mot (the French word for word) for the
ending -maux is a signal that to think about the animal, and thus the human, is to think
about language, "the unique and indivisible limit held to separate man from animal."67
This last element, -mot, because it is not easily distinguished aurally from -maux, but
would be visually striking in the printed text, also signals the fraught relationship
between speech and writing, and the whole host of problems of differentiation and
representation that plague language.
The rhetorical function of Derrida's awkward neologism is to jar the ear and shake
the listener's thought out of complacent passivity. Derrida promises his audience to avoid
overusing l’animot out of respect for "French ears too sensitive to spelling and grammar"
and asks them to do the work themselves of "silently substitut[ing] animot" for "the
animal" and "the animals."68 When Derrida's address is read in translation, l'animot,
untouched by the translator, likewise remains a stumbling block to the eye's smooth scan
across the page, repelling yet also engaging the reader. Derrida, calling upon his audience
as accomplices, willing or no, uses words against themselves, breaking words by

64. Ibid., 409.
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smashing them together so that the same energy that causes them to crumble causes them
to adhere and to lodge like a rough, irritating bit of gravel in the mind of the
listener/reader, to excite thought by neural chafing, and produce a brief moment of
disorientation.

In the title of this paper, I call my two primary texts animal texts. This is not a
phrase I am attempting to use to identify a category, type, or genre to which The Lives of
Animals and “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” belong. I simply mean
to use animal in an adjectival sense, modifying the vague, yet overburdened term text, to
say that these two works share some qualities in common with animals, and with each
other. They are not just texts about animals—animals as living creatures and animals as
ideas—but texts that are also animal-like: wily, difficult to hold, pin down, and pen up,
inscrutable, unpredictable, uncooperative and at times unresponsive, but at other times
seemingly friendly, yielding, familiar, and almost like they could be domesticated.
Really, any text could be so described, but these two texts especially exploit the
inevitable problems a text presents as a site of encounter between two (or more) others.
And their exploitation of those problems mirrors the problems of human encounters with
animals that they discuss: on the one hand, familiarity and understanding with the
text/animal, and on the other hand, estrangement and misunderstanding with the
text/animal.
What is more important to me than asserting the idea of these texts as animal texts
and making any claims about their peculiar or exceptional qualities, is an assertion that
the function of the correspondences between form and content in these texts is to evoke
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an intellectual uncertainty in their readers analogous to the crisis face-to-face encounters
with alterity can produce—or that I believe them to be able to produce. But in the end, I
have to wonder if I have found in these texts only the thing that I set out to look for and
not what is “really” there, or potentially there, in the text. Are my readings only an
example of anthropomorphism: instead of attributing my human qualities to an animal, I
attempt to legitimate my own a priori assertions by describing them as qualities inherent
in the text? Perhaps as a human encountering an animal other, the alterity confronted
within that encounter is merely a reflection of myself—a self I already experience for
reasons unknown to me according to a particular self/other dynamic. Likewise, closereading a text would merely be to re-write it in my own image.
In any case, what I wish to assert—as a bald, unwarranted assertion if
necessary—is that uncertainty is an efficacious disposition. It is not a proposition or
operation in a syllogistic chain, but an attitude toward knowledge with productive results.
The “Why can’t you?” of Coetzee’s fictional Costello and the seen seen of Derrida’s
autobiographical Derrida are models of a self disrupted by an encounter with an other,
but they are not models of a universal process like the mirror stage or the realization of
object permanence. As Derrida notes, many have “observed, analyzed, reflected on the
animal,” but not all have “been seen seen by the animal.”69 The disrupted self has a
disposition of uncertainty regarding knowledge of the other, be it an animal, a human, or
any of the other others composing the world, which can be efficacious. Operating with a
confident certainty, humans have fixed the whole of the world upon a map and placed
themselves in the center of that map; even what is undiscovered has a location on the map

69. Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” trans. David Wills,
Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 382.
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and what humans don’t know, they know they will soon know it. But a disposition of
uncertainty, reluctant to claim knowledge of what is “true” or “real,” unfurls the map of
the world further to imagine what might be rather than what is or must be. In other words,
certainty restricts the conditions of invention, whereas uncertainty multiplies them.
Finally, to suggest what a disposition of uncertainty has to do with rhetoric,
briefly consider two loci classici.
First, Aristotle: Rhetoric’s “function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in
each case the existing means of persuasion.”70 Above all, rhetoric is an art of invention
and its aim is to discover (invent) efficacious means of thinking and speaking about the
matter at hand (whatever it may be) in a way that is not merely theoretical but that
accomplishes some work. But Aristotle assumes a basic human capacity for real
knowledge of the world. Some paragraphs prior to what I’ve just quoted, Aristotle asserts
that “men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain
to it; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well
in regard to probabilities.”71 I would assert, however, that rhetoric’s heuristic function is
better served by a rejection of an attitude of certainty. A greater multiplicity of the
“means of persuasion” might be “found out” if the rhetor instead embraces a disposition
of uncertainty and the unlikelihood that any person can ever know everything that need
be know, might be known, could be known in order to establish any given path of action
with entire certainty in any given time and place.

70. Aristotle Rhetoric 1.1.14.
71. Ibid., 1.1.11

37

Second, Quintilian, who borrows from Cato a phrase that many in turn have
borrowed from Quintilian: an orator should be “a good man, skilled in speaking.”72
Quintilian emphasizes the importance of the goodness of the orator as a “man” to the
degree that he asserts that no one who is not good cannot learn to speak well:
But if the view that a bad man is necessarily a fool is not merely held by
philosophers, but is the universal belief of ordinary men, the fool will most
assuredly never become an orator. To this must be added the fact that the mind
will not find leisure ever for the study of the noblest of tasks, unless it first be free
from vice.73
But I assert that a disposition of uncertainty—especially regarding the other—is a great
virtue, and that the speech of a person with a disposition of uncertainty is likely to be
circumspect, restrained, perhaps even stammering and tending toward silence (or toward
digressive verbosity), so that lucid and readily persuasive speech is likely to in fact
proceed from an evil “man.” Cogency is cause for suspicion.

72. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 12.1.1.
73. Ibid., 12.1.4.
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